Abstract. We present an efficient method for analyzing information flow of a recursive program. In our method, security levels of data can be formalized as an arbitrary finite lattice. We prove the correctness of the proposed algorithm and also show that the algorithm can be executed in cubic time in the size of a program. Furthermore, the algorithm is extended so that operations which hide information of their arguments can be appropriately modeled by using a congruence relation. Experimental results by using a protypic system are also presented.
Introduction
In a system used by unspecified people, protecting information from undesirable leaking is essential. One of the ways to protect information from undesirable leaking is an access control technique called Mandatory Access Control (MAC). MAC requires that data and users (or processes) be assigned certain security levels represented by a label such as top-secret, confidential and unclassified. A label for a data d is called the security class (SC) of d, denoted as SC(d). A label for a user u is called the clearance of u, However, it is possible that a program with clearance higher than S C (d) reads data d, creates some data d 0 from d and writes d 0 to a storage which a user with clearance lower than SC(d) can read. Hence, an undesirable leaking may occur since data d 0 may contain some information on data d.
One way to prevent these kinds of information leaks is to conduct a program analysis which statically infers the SC of each output of the program when the SC of each input is given. Several program analyses based on a lattice model of SC have been proposed (see related works below); however, some of the program analyses can analyze only relatively simple programs which do not specifically contain a recursive procedure. Also, in some cases, the soundness of the analyses have not been proved. This paper proposes an algorithm which analyzes information flow of a program containing recursive procedures. The algorithm constructs equations from statements in the program. The equation constructed from a statement represents the information flow caused by the execution of the statement. The algorithm computes the least fixpoint of these equations. We describe the algorithm as an abstract interpretation and prove the soundness of the algorithm. For a given program Prog, the algorithm can be executed in O(klN) time where k is the maximum number of arguments of procedures in Prog, l is the number of procedures in Prog and N is the total size of Prog. Based on the proposed method, a prototypic system has been implemented. Experimental results by using the system are also presented.
In the algorithm proposed in this paper and most of all other existing methods, the SC of the result of a built-in operation (e.g., addition) is assumed to be the least upper bound of the SCs of all input arguments of . This means that information on each argument may flow into the result of the operation. However, this assumption is not appropriate for some operations such as an aggregate operation and an encryption operation. For these operations, it is practically difficult to recover information on input arguments from the result of the operation. Considering the above discussions, the proposed method is extended so that these operations can be appropriately modeled by using a congruence relation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the syntax and the operational semantics of a program language which will be the target language of the analysis. In section 3, we formally describe the program analysis algorithm, prove the correctness of the algorithm and show the time complexity of the algorithm. A brief example is also presented in section 3. The method is extended in section 4. Experimental results are briefly presented in section 5. [D76] and [DD77] are the pioneering works which proposed a systematic method of analyzing information flow based on a lattice model of security classes. Subsequently, Denning's analysis method has been formalized and extended in a various way by Hoare-style axiomatization [BBM94] , by abstract interpretation [O95] , and by type theory [VS97, HR98, LR98] .
Related Works
In a type theoretic approach, a type system is defined so that if a given program is well-typed then the program has noninterference property such that it does not cause undesirable information flow.
[VS97] provides a type system for statically analyzing information flow of a simple procedural program and proves its correctness. The method in [VS97] [SV98] showed that their type system in [VS97] is no longer correct in a distributed environment and presented a new type system for a multi-threaded language. How to extend our method to fit a distributed environment is a future study.
A structure of security classes modeled as a finite lattice is usually a simple one such as ftop-secret, confidential, unclassifiedg. [ML98] proposes a finer grained model of security classes called decentralized labels. Based on this model, [M99] proposes a programming language called JFLOW, for which a static type system for information flow analysis as well as a simple but flexible mechanism for dynamically controlling the privileges is provided. However, their type system has not been formally verified.
[JMT99,NTS01] propose methods of deciding for a given program P and a global security property whether every reachable state of P satisfies .
Definitions

Syntax of Program
In this section, we define the syntax and semantics of a programming language which will be the input language to the proposed algorithm. This language is a simple procedural language similar to C.
A program is a finite set of function definitions. A function definition has the following form:
f (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) local y 1 ; : : : ; y m fP f g where f is a function name x 1 ; : : : ; x n are formal arguments of f , y 1 ; : : : ; y m are local variables and P f is a function body The syntax of P f is given below where c is a constant x is a local variable or a formal argument, f is a function name defined in the program and is a built-in operator such as addition and multiplication. Any object generated by cseq can be P f . Objects derived from exp, cmd or cmd 1 , cseq or cseq 1 are called an expression, a command, a sequence of commands, respectively. An execution of a program Prog is the evaluation of the function named main, which should be defined in Prog. Inputs for Prog are actual arguments of main and the output of Prog for these inputs is the return value of main.
Semantics of Program
We assume the following types to define the operational semantics of a program. Let 2 denote the cartesian product and + denote the disjoint union.
type val(values) We assume for each n-ary built-in operator , n-ary We define a mapping which provides the semantics of a program. This mapping takes a store and one of an expression, a command and a sequence of commands as arguments and returns a store or a value. j =: (store ! exp ! val) + ( store ! cmd ! (store + val)) + ( store ! cseq ! (store + val)) -j = M ) v means that a store evaluates an expression M to the value v, that is, if M is evaluated by using then v is obtained.
means that a store becomes 0 if a command C is executed.
-j = C ) v means that if a command C is executed when the store is then the value v is returned. This mapping is defined only when C has the form of 'return M ' for some expression M . -Similar for a sequence of commands.
Below we provide axioms and inference rules which define the semantic mapping, where the following meta-variables are used.
x; x 1 ; : : : ; y 1 ; : : : : var M;M 1 ; : : : : exp C : cmd or cmd 1 P;P 1 ; P 2 : cseq or cseq 1 ; 0 ; 00 : store 
j= M ) true j= P ) 0 0 j= while M do P od ) 00 j= while M do P od ) 00
j= C ) 0 0 j= P ) 00 (rsp: v) j= C; P ) 00 (rsp:v)
A security class (abbreviated as SC) represents the security level of a value in a program.
Let SCset be a finite set of security classes. Also assume that a partial order v is defined on SCset and (SCset, v) forms a lattice; let ? denote the minimum element of SCset and let a 1 ta 2 denote the least upper bound of a 1 and a 2 for a 1 ; a 2 2 SCset. Intuitively, 1 v 2 means that 2 is more secure than 1 ; it is legal that a user with clearance 2
can access a value with SC 1 . A simple example of SCset is:
The purpose of the analysis is to infer (an upper bound of) the SC of the output value when an SC of each input is given. Precisely, the analysis problem for a given program Prog is to infer an SC of the output value of Prog which satisfies the soundness property defined in section 3.3.
We first describe the analysis algorithm in section 3.1. The soundness of the proposed algorithm is proved in section 3.3.
The Algorithm
To describe the algorithm, we use the following types. [D76] . Consider the following command. if x = 0 then y := 0 else y := 1 fi In this command, the variable x occurs neither in y := 0 nor in y := 1. However, after executing this command, we can know whether x is 0 or not by checking whether y is 0 or 1. Therefore, we can consider information on the value stored in the variable x flows into the variable y. In general, information may flow from the conditional clause of a "if" command into "then" and "else" clauses and also it may flow from the conditional clause of a "while" command into "do" clause. 
An Example
In this subsection, we show how our analysis algorithm works. , that is, the SC of the return value of the main function is low when the SC of the actual argument is low and the SC of the return value of the main function could be high when the SC of the actual argument is high.
Soundness of the Algorithm
As mentioned in section 3.1, the analysis algorithm is a function of the following type: 
u t 4 An Extended Model
The algorithm A in the previous section has been defined for any built-in operator as:
This means that we assume information contained in each argument may flow into the result of the operation I . However, this assumption is too conservative for a certain operation. For example, if an operation I is defined as I (x; y) = x, then it is clear that information in the second argument does not flow into the result of the operation. Another example is an encryption. Assume that for a plain text d and an encryption key k, the result of the operation E I (d; k) is the cipher text of d with key k. We may consider that the SC of E(x; y) is low even if the SCs of x and y are both high.
To express the above mentioned properties of particular built-in operations, we generalize the above definition as: is not sound. Intuitively, the fact that the SC of expression E(x; y) is inferred as low means that we cannot recover information contained in the arguments x; y from the result of the encryption. In other words, E I (d 1 ; k ) and E I (d 2 ; k ) are indistinguishable with respect to the information in the arguments. To express this indistinguishability, we introduce the following notions.
A relation R on type val is called a congruence relation if R is an equivalence relation which satisfies:
for each n-ary built-in operator , if c i R c In the following, we assume that a particular congruence relation is given. mk-rpt I (c 0 ). Intuitively, this means that we cannot discover information on a particular patient's record by reading a doctor's report.
u t
Example 3 (encryption). Let E be an encryption function which takes a plain text and an encryption key as arguments. Assume that no information in the plain text can be discovered by manipulating the encrypted text. In this case, we can define 
It is not difficult to prove the following theorem in a similar way to the proof of theorem 1. u t
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an algorithm which can statically analyze the information flow of a procedural program containing recursive definitions. It has been shown that the algorithm is sound and that the algorithm can be executed in polynomial time in the size of an input program. In [Y01] , the proposed algorithm is extended to be able to analyze a program which may contain global variables and a prototypic analysis system has been implemented. Table 1 shows the execution time to analyze sample programs by the implemented system. Extending the proposed method so that we can analyze a program which has pointers and/or object-oriented features is a future study.
